In
1534 King Francis I of France ordained his infantery to be organized in
seven “legions” of 6000 men in each. The idea and the number
was plucked from Roman sources. Francis and his advisers considered Rome
and Greece as excellent examples for improving warfare. This however, one
could say, was a result of the Renaissance culture, where everything ancient
and antique came into fashion. Ancient pagan Gods saw daylight, ancient
litterature were republished, buildings were constructed according to Roman
pattern and so were warfare (Arnold T, "The Renaissance at War, 2001"
pg. 54).
Francis
dreamed of making his infantery into the disciplined and controlled armies
of Caesar and Alexander, thus a time of experimenting with modern and ancient
warfare took place. The 16th century was a period of sophisticated military
men and booksih theorists, who tried to recreate both on paper and in reality
the forms and discipline of the infantery armies of the ancient world.
Two of those reformers were the Nassau cousins and professional generals,
William Louise and Maurice of Nassau. In 1594, William Louise fancied a
new musketery fire-discipline after reading a description by the ancient
author Aelian of Roman soldiers firing Javelins and sling-stones. He sent
a letter to his cousin Maurice who took his thoughts seriously. Williams
ideas became an essential part of a successfull new regulation drill for
the Dutch Army. The Nassau cousins were much celebrated by contemporaries.
Maurice was also inspired by his advisor Julius Lipsius, author of a 1595
analysis of the Roman Army (Arnold T, "The Renaissance at War, 2001"
pg. 56-57).
Another
work published at the same time was “Military Parallels” by
an Italian named Francesco Patrici. His book was dedicated to the project
of accomodating “the various customs and the regulations of the ancients”
to modern firearms.
The perhaps first effort to reform infantry “al antica”, occured
in 1513-14 when Bartolomeo d’Alviano tried to transform the armies
of the Republic of Venice. Alvino proposed regular and standard infantry
companies of 256 men, a perfect squareformation of sixteen ranks and sixteen
files. In his proposals he used latin terms and titles(Arnold T, "The
Renaissance at War, 2001" pg. 58). One must remember that the infantry
reformers who looked back to the ancients, were searching for an overall
improvment and discipline, not just tactics. The Renaissance world culture
of soldiering was essentially mercenary. Paid units were usually hard to
lead. It was the money which motivated men to fight and financial problems
was a problem for rulers. The question was how to make men more connected
with the loyalty of their nation than that of the gold. Here the legions
of Rome seemed a perfect model. Roman virtue like devotion to the state
was attractive to those ordering military affairs. Reformers wanted by other
means more than a tactical scheme. They wanted a whole new militaty ethic(Arnold
T, "The Renaissance at War, 2001" pg. 58-59).
The
greatest military writer during the renaissance was Niccolo Machiavelli.
Apart from his most famous work “Il Principe” (The Prince) written
1512-13, he wrote a treatise on war. “L’Arte della Guerra”
(The Art of War) written 1520-21. It is written in a form of conversation
which takes place in a Florentine garden. The maincharacter is Fabricio
Colonna member of a noble family who served as a mercenary commander during
the wars in Northern Italy. Machiavelli himself had during the years 1498-1512
been in charge of conductiong Florence’s war against Pisa. Machiavellis
work however takes a lots of it’s theories and illustrations from
the ancient world and are hoplessley out of date. His key propositionsm
- underestimation of artillery, recommendation that pikes be supplemented
with swords and buckler and his preference for citizen-soldiers instead
of professionals – proved to be death wrong (Creveld. M, The Art of
War, 2002, pg 68-73).