To call the conduct of war at the higher level by a new name (strategy) was one thing. But to form principles for it was an entirely different matter, and during the whole 1700s no writer was successful with it. The earliest treatise concerning this matter was produced by a Preussian officer, Adam Heinrich Dietrich von Buelow, whose “Geist des neuern Kriegssystems” (Spirit of the Modern System of War) appeared in 1799. Buelow based much of his theories on the improved mapmaking (Creveld. M, The Art of War, 2002, pg 94). Maps and geography are essential in planning military campaign. But in ancient times commanders often had to rely on mere sketches or their own or others knowledge of the terrain. The maps that were available were often guesswork. With Buelow the first shift between the views on strategy and tactics appeared. His system marked “an entirely new way of looking at war”. For centuries commanders had busied themselves with the best method for raising and training an army, building camps etc. Buelow shifted the emphasis from what we would call the organizational and tactical aspect towards the larger operation of war.

Buelows successor was Antonie Henri Jomini. A Swiss citizen who served under Napoleon. Even though his military carer wasn’t brilliant he became a prominent figure of military strategy and had much influence.

Like Buelow, Jomini conceived strategy in terms of and forces moving against each other in two dimensional space. Much more than Buelow whose mind tended to work in eighteenth century geometrical terms, he was prepared to take into account such complicating factors as roads, rivers, mountains etc. which hindered manoeuvres. As with Buelow the problem was to find a system which would guide a commander in conducting those movements. The most important elemtent of the system remained as before, bases, objectives and lines of operations of which there could be various numbers and which stood in various relationships to each other.
All armies then had lines of operation or as we would say today, communications. Earlier commanders such as Alexander and Gustavus had been able to survive for years in enemy territory while maintaining only the most important lines with home. Now however the whole point of the art of war was to cut one’s enemy’s lines of operations without exposing one’s own.

Jomini’s earliest work on strategy the “Traité des grandes operations militaries” (Treatise on Grand Operations of War), was published in 1804-5. In his most mature work, “Précis de l’art de la guerre” (The Art of War) of 1830, he has much to say about the political uses to which war could be put and also about the resources and military institutions of different states. At the same time he extends the work to include formations, tactics, various kinds of special operations such as the crossing of rivers. Jomini tried to like all his Enlightenment predecessors to create a system, particular in his earlier works. This forced him to present war as more rational than it really is, given that only the rational can be systematically analysed and thought (Creveld. M, The Art of War, 2002, pg 99-100).

From about 1770 on, this view came under attack due to the romantic movement which insisted that the emotions of the heart and not only calculations stood in the epicentre of human life. The most important critic was a Preussian officer, Georg Heinric Berenhorst. His work “Betrachtungen über dire Kriegskunst” (Reflections on the Art of war) was published in three volumes between 1796 and 1799. Berenhorst meant that military abouthors had overestimated the role of firm laws while underestimating that of the forces of human emotions. A soldier was more than a robot and an army more than a machine. Also the state of mind decided the outcome of a battle even though it was incalculable.
Berenhorsts work was very popular during the years after 1800. He and Jomini formed opposite poles. The first claimed the irrational perspective of war and the latter the rational. Both poles were to be united by the greatest military western military theoretician of all times, Karl von Clausewitz. A Preussian general who published his grand opus “On war” in 1832.

Like almost all other military writers since 1800, Clausewitz wanted to penetrate the secret of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare. He accepted that the Revolution had made it possible for war to be waged “with the full energy of the nation”. Clausewitz focused on two questions, what was war and what purpose did it serve? He constantly checked his answers against history and own experience (Creveld. M, The Art of War, 2002, pg 108). He was not to go into the details of equipment and formations. Clausewitz distinguished between tactics and strategy. He had much to say about bravery and endurance both in the commander and in the army. War was a duel between two independent minds. War was a product of social intercourse “a continuation of policy by other means”.

In this view, war was an instrument which conduct had to be laid not by the commander-in-chief but by the political leadership. This view enabled Clausewitz to argue that was morally neutral. There can be no war without bloodshed and an error committed out of a feeling of benevolence is the worst (Creveld. M, The Art of War, 2002, pg 112).

Jomini could be considered as Clausewitz opposite. Both of them critisized eachother in their works. Clausewitz wrote in “Vom Kriege” that Jomini made the same mistakes as the 18th century militarythinkers did. Therefore his conclusions wouldn’t be efficient when practisized in battle. Jomini countered in his “Précis de l’art de la guerre” (1837) that Clausewitz was too sceptical to science. What also divided their oppinions was that Jomini considered the offensive as the most proper form of warfare, especially on strategic level. If defence was a must then it had to be active – not passive. Passive things were not good (Wars of Europe, 1998, by Alf W. Johansson pg. 51).
It didn’t matter how well organized an army was if the government ignored to maintain the military spirit. All civilservants, businness- and industrial people should be subordinate to the Army. Militarymen were always to be more prefered than others in administrative positions. Jomini was in other words, a keen supporter for a militarization of society. He separated between the enthusiasm (l’exaltation morale) and the military spirit (l’esprit militaire). Both of them could reach the same point but the former was a result of political, religious and native-love. The latter on the other hand, was created by good leadership and instituons (Wars of Europe, 1998, by Alf W. Johansson pg. 57-58).

Another name to mention among the giants of military thoughts is General Von Willisen. In his work “Theorie des grossen Krieges” (1840-48) is lots of critique directed against Clausewitz. Wilisen considered it possible to create a system for guidance in warfare (Wars of Europe, 1998, by Alf W. Johansson pg. 51-59). General von Willisen was born in 1790. He participated in the campaign of 1806, 1809 and served as staff-officer in Blüchers army. After the war he became a teacher at the academy in Berlin. As a military teoretican he is seen as the fullfiller of “the geometrical view”. Willisen was more restricted than Clausewitz. For example is the connection between war and politics totally ignored as well as psychological factors. He concentrates only on the armies and their movements. An army is something which is in need of certain supplies. It’s needs must be satisfied every day. From this fact Willisen built his thories on “lines of communications”. Strategy is simply about attacking the enemys supplylines and protect ones own. Willisens way of thinking was mechanical and his doctrines was only the beginning of later developments within the same subject.

To Clausewitz, war and politics was a unity. But during the 19th century a cleft would appear between state and society. The armed forces would occupy itself in technical solutions for warfar, and politics was avoided (Wars of Europe, 1998, by Alf W. Johansson pg. 61-66).