Clausewitz military thought differs from all his predecessors. They approached history in their treatises. Throughout the 18th century most writers on military affairs insisted that the best authors to study were Frontinus and Vegetius. Buelow and Berenhorst starts their works by comparing ancient warfare with the modern (Creveld. M, The Art of War, 2002, pg 118-119). Still, with Buelow the situation began to change, the ancient had nothing to say about strategy, the subject on which he made the greatest contribution. Jomini never mentioned the ancients (Creveld. M, The Art of War, 2002, pg 119).

But also the intellectual climate of this time began to change. The Enlightenment movement gave way for the Romantic. Philosophers such as Vico and Hegel gave a new view on history which emphasized the “otherness” of the past rather than its similarity with the present. In Clausewitz work “On War” the ancients are not mentioned at all (Creveld. M, The Art of War, 2002, pg 120).With this revolution in historical thought it was clear that the old trusted methods for thought on war would no longer do. The armies had grown bigger and the weapons changed. By the middle of the 19th century parade-like battles were rare. New quick-firing weapons began to appear around 1830. These developments made it questionable weather troops could fire standing in tight formations like before. A period of experiments followed. During the Civil War in America, commanders who had never led large units and unprofessional troops did not hesitate to seek shelter and make camouflage when it was necessary.

One of the most important authors who tried to approach this new phenomenon was a French officer, Charles-Jean-Jacques Ardant du Picq (1821-70). In his works he followed Berenhorst and Clausewitz and considered that the key to war was to be found in the hear of man and not in geometrical calculations. More than Clausewitz he was prepared to look into the factors which rendered that the heart was partly immune to the horrors of battle (Creveld. M, The Art of War, 2002, pg 123). In his attempts to find out what made men fight, he restorted to two different methods. One was to make detailed studies of ancient warfare when battles had been “simple and clear”. The other was a questionnaire which he sent out to his fellow officers and in which he interviewed them close about in which way their men fought in combats and what inflienced them.

Du Picq was killed in the Franco-Preussian War, but by that time his “Études de Combat” (Battle Studies) was largely completed. During his lifetime his work drew little attention, but this changed during the late 1890s when the French recovered from the defeat of 1870-71 and strated looking for a methid to defeat the superior German army. Good organization, through traininng firm command and patriotism if the French soldier were to turn him into an impressive fighting animal. Due to that he never rose beyond the rank of colonel, du Picq had very little to say about strategy (Creveld. M, The Art of War, 2002, pg 125). From about 1830, strategy was being revolutionized not onlu by rapid-firing arms but also by railways.

Noone was more closely associated with their use than the Preussian chief of staff, Hemlut von Moltke (1800-1891). A practitioner rather than theoretican. Moltke did not bother to go into first principles nor does he mention any of his predecessors (Creveld. M, The Art of War, 2002, pg 126). His starting point was the rise in the size of armies that had take place as a result of growing population and industrialization. Instead of tens of thousands, they now numbered houndreds of thousands. The problem was how to mobolize them quicklu and deploy them on the frontier, and here railways came into hand. Appointed chief of general staff, Moltke went to work. Extremely detailed plans were drawn up for using railways in order to carry out mobilization. To Molte therefore, strategy remained what it had been from Buelow and onwards: a question of moving large forces about in two dimensional space so as to put them into battleposition.

The younger generation at the generaltaff after Moltke did not posess their predecessors broad vision instead, possibly because of the attention they paid to railways they tended to be technically inclined and narrowminded. Noobody made an better example than Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913). Appointed chief of staff in 1891. His problem was to prepare his country for war on two fronts. After years of work he presented a plan which would forever be associated with his name. The Schlieffen plan would be used in the first phases of the WW1. With Schlieffen we have arrived at the end of the 19th century.

The major wars between 1854-1871 had a great impact on military thinking. These wars were:
• The Crimean War 1854-1856
• The Franco-Austrian War 1859
• The American Civil War 1861-1865

The German Wars for Unification
• The War Denmark-Prussia 1864
• The War Austria-Prussia 1866
• The Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871

Above these wars two other factors shaped the thinking patterns, these were
1) the technical developments
2) political ideologies.

From mid-1800 the political climate was colored by liberalism and nationalism. The liberalism had it’s roots in Great Brittain and supported outspoken freedom. The nationalism was the continutaion of the Roman Empire’s ideas of a “national spirit”. People who spoke the same language and shared the same culture should be brought together. These two ideologies were difficult to unite, but both of them would conflict the conservatism and monarchism. The revolutions 1848 had a nationalistic theme. Rulers in late 19th century Germany are good examples on how a people could be persuaded with national pride to fight (Wars of Europe, 1998, by Alf W. Johansson pg. 81-84).

The Crimean War was a complicated conflict with contradictory features. It was a modern as well as an oldfashioned war with medieval sieges, trenchwar, fieldbattles, spectacular cavalrycharges etc. Although the war ended almost undecided, it gave a forecast of what comming wars would be like (Wars of Europe, 1998, by Alf W. Johansson pg. 81-84).

The Franco-Austrian War took place in Italy. Austria declared War on France but was utterly defeated in two battles, Magneta and Solferino. The main causes for France’s success was the use of railroads for fast transport and better firepower. Even though Austria the austrians had a better rifle – Lorentz, they couldn’t take advantage of it’s capacity while they charged in tight masses. The bullets merely went over the heads of the French who often launced bayonett-charges. Both sides would afterwards draw the wrong conclusions of their experineces. The austrians saw no reason for a more spread out formation since shock-charges had proved to be more powerfull than exchange of fire. The French acquired an ardent belief of the possibilities of improvisation.

The most modern war during the 19th century were not fought on the European Continent, but in the USA. By it’s extent, intensity, endurance and huge losses, The Civil War would give a prelook of what 20th Century warfare. It differed greatly from european wars. The wars 1866 and 1870-71 had limited goals without any fundamental ideologies. The Civil War was as a whole a conflict betweeen agricaultural and an industrial states. 90% of the industrial production and 80% of the manpower suitable for military service belonged to the Northern States. The armies of the South were however better led and would cause those of the North much damage. Battles were mainly fought by infantery. When the counterparts met on the field they would start dig themselves down if possible. The fieldbattles tended to become smaller trenchwars. The strength of the defensive made frontcharges devastating (Fredricksburg, Gettysburg). At the end, the war would affect the civilpopulation. In it’s attempts to force a final decision, the North began to use more violent and brutal methods. General Shermans much mentioned march through Georgia is the most famous example. The same method was about to be used in WW2 in form of terrorbombing over major cities (Wars of Europe, 1998, by Alf W. Johansson pg. 86-88).

The German Wars of Unification

The European Wars wich were fought before 1871 left a heritage to the military thinking in all states involved. This heritage was crucial for the development and outcome of WW1.
When Otto Von Bismarck (1815-1898) finally became Reich canchellor of Germany a unification which would lead to the founding of The German Empire with Preussia as supreme state began.
In three conflicts with Denmark, Austria and France – Germany was united. The form of powerrule Bismarck conducted also left a fatal heritage to the new nation. Bismarck was a prussian nationalist. After the death of Fredrick the Great 1786, Prussia had fallen into a semi-lethargical state only to brutally be woken up by Napoleon in 1806. a wave of nationalistic pride ran through Prussia and cretaed a new type of soldier, a soldier filled with enthusiasm and psychologically better fit to march into battle. After 1871 the army siezed first place in the German Empire and the citizens would actively take part in the militarisitc thinking (Wars of Europe, 1998, by Alf W. Johansson pg. 88-91).

The spirit in the danish army 1864 was good but the leadershiup bad. After a stubborn but hopeless struggle against a united force of austrians and prussians, it was forced to surrender at the redoubts of Dyböl. Disagrements between Austria and Prussia about how the booty should be divided led to a new wer in 1866. It was a conflict between halfbrothers which ended in debacle for Austria at Königgrätz. The war of 1866 would in turn lead to the Franco-Prussian War. France had hoped for an austrian victory which never came. When France watched Germanys power grow, it saw it’s position threatened.

The French army which marched into battle 1870 was confident of victory. It considered itself better equiped. The french army was a profesional army while the prussian was a conscript. But the latter had a burning spirit of braveness, better artillery, better officers, greater number and a more efficient mobilizesystem. The war ended in cathastrophe frpn France at the Battle of Sedan and the siege of Paris. The Franco-Prussian War would like it’s predecessorn, not revolutionize military thinking. It was analyzed in napoleonic terms and a clear majortity considered it was the fieldbattles which decided the outcome.

The period 1871-1914
The period after the Franco-Prussian War was a period of ideolofies and oppositions. The industrialization in Europe supported powers which praised the war and made massproduction of weapons possible. But the urbanization and the misery many workers faced in the cities created anoter support to the powers of war on a mental level. The war was weived as something which would lead to renewal and a new solidarity among humans. The industrialization made it possible for people to free themselves off old thining patterns and create new ones. when old religious thoughts gradually solved, substitutes took their places. The foremost of them, the nationalism, acquired religious aspects. The consequence was that WW1 was characterized by the same fanatism of religious wars. As a whole WW1 could be considered as a war of nationalism. It was the nationalistic enthusiasm which exceedingly gave the Great War it’s total shape. It increased the rivalry between the states and made with it’s conservatism a contrast to the quite newborn socialism and workersforce. By the end of the 19th century, Europe was in the grasp of nationalism. Even though some pacifist movements occured, the militarism was strong.

The daily life in Germany was conducted by mlitary attitudes and values. These were spread thourgh press, litterature, songs, school, sport and more. The citizens were of the opinion that theit nationalistic dreams of power could not be fulfilled without a strong military force.The great wars of the 19th century had impacts on military thought but they did not revolutionize. The successes during the Wars of Unification would not add any new material in proportion to the rapid development of weapontechnology. Not even France made new conclusions after the debacles 1870-71. Disasters were explained by the fact that they had been inferior in number and late in mobilizing (Wars of Europe, 1998, by Alf W. Johansson pg. 153 and 166)

In military thought there has always been a balance between defensive and offensive. Militarymen have mostly prefered to think in terms of offensive. The reason is that offensive is viewed as something positive. In 1880s France, offensive was considered as suitable for the nationalcharacter. But it has also been said that the gap between myth and reality has never beeen bigger that it was before WW1. All armies were focused on charge and offensive. Even though the Franco-Prussian War had made clear the murderous firepower of modern weapons, noone had realized the impossibility of charges in open field. The offensive-thinking was kept because it upheld the national spirit (Wars of Europe, 1998, by Alf W. Johansson pg. 158-59).
At end the experiences of the Franco-Prussian War were held back or simply ignored. Thus the period after 1871 was distinguished by “escape from reality” (Wars of Europe, 1998, by Alf W. Johansson pg. 160).

Another thing which contributed to the confirmation of the soldiers own prejudices, was the modern massarmies. These created a sense that high losses was something to be accepted.
The only person who truly realized the character of modern warfare was a civilian – Ivan bloch. In his work “The Future War from a technological, economic and political aspect” (1898), he gave a broader analyze of the new problems than was made in military publishings. Bloch wrote frankly that decisive battles were impossible and the only way for soldiers to protect themselves from the new weapons, was to “dig down”. The spade would be more important that the rifle for survival. A battle would not last one or two days but for months. Of course Bloch and his warnings were ignored.

General Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929) was a child of his time. His thoughs on military-matterscircled around the will-controlled moments of battle. Here he had similarities with his predecessor Du Picq. Foch had volunteered in the war 1870-71 and did a straight carrer in the army until he reached the rank of brigadier-general in 1907. He was convinced that the key to victory was not to be found in theoretical principles but in will-power and offensive was the natural form of warfare. In his “Des principles de la guerre” 1904 he wrote that “a won battle is a were one has refused to accept defeat”. Fochs writings gave however mostly a picture of the spirit of that time. He never cared to discuss the defenders advantages towards the attacker, especially when he is dug-down in a trench. Foch firmly meant that the incrased firepower was of advantage for offensive. An attack should be carried out in “l’ordre linéare” (order of line) to make sure that the psychological effect didn’t get lost. Search for shelter was to be prevented at any cost as it spolied the unity. The charge should carried out in napoleonic style “in mass, accompanied by drums and music”. Foch would later be commander in WW1.